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BAN logicAbstract Recently, many identity-based two-party authenticated key agreement (ID-2PAKA) pro-
tocols using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) have been proposed, however, these protocols do not
provide adequate security and their computation costs are also relatively high due to bilinear pair-
ing and map-to-point function. Moreover, they require many communication rounds for establish-
ing the session key, and thus results in increased communication latency, which makes them
unsuitable for real applications. This paper thus aims to propose a pairing-free ID-2PAKA protocol
based on ECC that removes the security flaws of previous protocols. The proposed protocol helps
two users to establish a common session key between them through an open network. The formal
security analysis using BAN logic and the comparisons with other protocols are given, which
demonstrated that our protocol is formally secure and thus, suitable for secure and efficient
peer-to-peer communications.
 2015 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud University. This is
an open access article under theCCBY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The flexibility and the mobility of mobile networks help the
mobile users to access the network at anytime from anywhere
with their personal devices (i.e., laptop, mobile phone). Fur-ther, the rapid advancement and deployment of mobile net-
works, and the portability of hand-held mobile devices
attract mobile users to communicate with each other over
mobile networks. However, the security and the privacy pro-
tection of communicating users in mobile networks are still
two important issues, which must be achieved before using
the mobile network for various purposes. Recently, the
authenticated key agreement protocols are becoming popular
with great attention paid for secure and reliable communica-
tion in many wireless mobile applications such as IP Multime-
dia Subsystem (Song et al., 2011), authentication protocol
(Wang et al., 2010; Islam and Biswas, 2011; Lee et al., 2011),
wireless mobile ad hoc networks (Liaw et al., 2005), mobile
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types of authenticated key agreement protocols can be found:
authenticated group key agreement protocol (Znaidi and
Minier, 2011; Park and Jin, 2010; Kim and Kim, 2011; Islam
and Biswas, 2012) and two-party authenticated key agreement
(2PAKA) protocol (Smart, 2002; Chen and Kudla, 2002;
Shim, 2003; Sun and Hsieh, 2003; Ryu et al., 2004; Boyd
and Choo, 2005; Wang et al., 2009, 2008; McCullagh and
Barreto, 2005; Xie, 2004; Li et al., 2005; Choie et al., 2005;
Zhu et al., 2007; Cao et al., 2008, 2010; Islam and Biswas,
2012; Ho¨lbl et al., 2012). The authenticated group key agree-
ment protocols allow users (more than two) to come up with
a common secret session key between them, whereas in the
2PAKA protocol, a common session is established between
two communicating users. In both cases, the users can securely
exchange the message encrypted by the session key over any
hostile network. In the literature, the password-based authen-
ticated key exchange protocol (Sui et al., 2005; Lu et al., 2007;
Chang and Chang, 2008; Lo et al., 2010; Pu, 2010; Youn et al.,
2011; Guo et al., 2008, 2012) can also be found, which allows
two communicating users to generate a session key over any
open network. However, the high computation cost and
numerous communication rounds of these protocols, where a
secret or a password is shared between a pair of users or with
a trusted server prior to communication, makes them unsuit-
able for environments of low-power mobile devices. Therefore,
this paper concentrates on the design of a secure and pairing-
free ID-2PAKA protocol using elliptic curve cryptography
(ECC) Miller et al., 1985; Koblitz, 1987 and identity-based
cryptosystem (IBC) Shamir et al., 1981 suitable for low-
power mobile devices.
1.1. Discussion about relevant works
In the literature, several ID-2PAKA protocols based on bilin-
ear pairing along with a map-to-point hash function that is
used to convert a random string to point on the elliptic curve
group, and ECC have been proposed and some of them are
discussed now. Based on the identity-based encryption scheme
(Boneh and Franklin, 2001), Smart (2002) proposed an ID-
2PAKA protocol, but it does not provide the perfect forward
secrecy (PFS) of the session key (Chen and Kudla, 2002; Shim,
2003). Shim (2003)) proposed an efficient ID-2PAKA protocol
using Weil pairing and claimed that it removes the security
flaws of Smart (2002). Sun and Hsieh (2003)) demonstrated
that Shim’s protocol is not secure against the man-in-the-
middle attack (MIMA). Based on the bilinear pairing, Ryu
et al. (2004) proposed an ID-2PAKA protocol, which has vul-
nerability against the key-compromised impersonation (K-CI)
attack (Boyd and Choo, 2005). In 2009, Wang et al. (2009)
independently showed that Ryu’s protocol is not secure against
the reflection attack (RA) and then proposed an improved pro-
tocol and claimed that known attacks are protected. Xie (2004)
showed that the ID-2PAKA protocol proposed by McCullagh
and Barreto (2005) is not secure against the K-CI attack and
then proposed an enhanced protocol. However, Li et al.
(2005) analyzed that Xie’s protocol is still insecure against
the K-CI attack. In 2008, Wang et al. (2008) proposed an
improved protocol over Chen and Kudla’s protocol. In 2005,
Choie et al. (2005) proposed some efficient pairing-based
ID-2PAKA protocols, and claimed that the protocols aredesigned to provide required security attributes with minimal
communication overheads.
In 2005, Sui et al. (2005) proposed an ECC-based
password-based authenticated key agreement protocol, which
offers PKG’s (private key generator) perfect forward security
and was included in 3GPP2 (third generation partnership pro-
ject) specifications to improve the security of the authenticated
key distribution protocol useful for wireless communications.
However, Lu et al. (2007) shows that the protocol is vulnerable
to the off-line password guessing attack, and then proposed an
improvement of the protocol in Sui et al. (2005).
Unfortunately, Chang and Chang (2008) proved that Lu
et al.’s protocol is not secure against the password guessing
attack and then proposed a modified protocol to remove the
security flaws of Lu et al. (2007). However, Lo et al. (2010)
demonstrated that Chang et al.’s protocol lacks to provide
the mutual authentication property. Lo et al. also proposed
an improved password-based authenticated key agreement
protocol using ECC and claimed that the protocol could resist
various attacks. In 2010, (Pu, 2010) independently demon-
strated that Lu’s protocol could not resist the off-line pass-
word guessing attack. Recently, Youn et al. (2011) have
discovered some security weaknesses of Guo et al.’s protocol
(Guo et al., 2008) and proposed an efficient protocol. In
2012, Guo et al. (2012) proposed another efficient and
provably secure password-based authenticated key agreement
protocol for wireless communications.
1.2. Motivations
Most of the 2PAKA protocols proposed so far can be imple-
mented using two costly operations such as bilinear pairings
and map-to-point (MTP) function. In addition, some of these
protocols need a number of communication rounds for suc-
cessful key establishment, which in turn leads to high commu-
nication latency. In order to reduce the computation cost, Zhu
et al. (2007) and Cao et al. (2008) independently proposed two
pairing-free ID-2PAKA protocols, but these protocols require
three communication rounds. In 2010, Cao et al. (2010) pro-
posed another two-round pairing-free ID-2PAKA protocol
with minimum computation costs. Unfortunately, (Islam and
Biswas, 2012) demonstrated that Cao et al.’s protocol (Cao
et al., 2010) is vulnerable to known session-specific temporary
attack (KSTIA) and key off-set attack (KOA)/key replicating
attack (KRA). From these discussions, it can be concluded
that the previous protocols are unsuitable for resource-
constrained (battery-power, processing, memory or computa-
tion) environments for the following reasons: (1) most of the
existing authenticated key agreement protocols have high com-
putation costs and communication rounds, and none of them
can provide adequate security, (2) in some password-based
authenticated key agreement protocols, two users in a group
can achieve mutual authentication and session key agreement
if they share a password (secret) in advance, which is unsuit-
able for large scale peer-to-peer communication networks,
since each user is required to keep a large number of secrets
corresponding to all group members, and (3) in other
password-based authenticated key agreement protocols, each
user pre-shares a secret with a trusted server and
communicates with other users via the server for which many
communication rounds are to be performed. As we know, the
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with the number of communication rounds and thus, more
delay is involved in the transmit-response phase of the partic-
ipating users. Lack of security and computation of the earlier
protocols also encourage us to investigate and develop a new
secure 2PAKA protocol that can easily be used for low-
power mobile devices.1.3. Our contributions
In this paper, we proposed an improved pairing-free
ID-2PAKA protocol using ECC and IBC for two-party
communication through an insecure channel, which possesses
minimum communication rounds. The proposed protocol is
secure, user-friendly and suitable for mobile networks due to
the following properties:
(1) Elimination of public key certificate: The proposed
ID-2PAKA protocol is based on the identity-based
cryptosystem, which has an inherent property that it
does not require any certificate to authenticate the pub-
lic key. Accordingly, our protocol does not require any
public key certificate to authenticate users’ public key.
(2) Bilinear pairing- and MTP hash function- free realization:
In the literature, many pairing-free ID-2PAKA proto-
cols (Cao et al., 2008, 2010; Debiao et al., 2011) have
been designed. The relative computation cost of the
bilinear pairing is approximately two to three times
more than an elliptic curve scalar point multiplication
(ECPM) and the computation cost of the MTP hash
function is more than an ECPM (Cao et al., 2010;
Islam and Biswas, 2012). In addition, the implementa-
tion of bilinear pairing needs a non-singular elliptic
curve group with large order and the MTP hash func-
tions usually implemented as a probabilistic algorithm
(Zhu et al., 2007; Cao et al., 2008). Similar to the proto-
cols given in Cao et al. (2008, 2010), the proposed
protocol is easy to implement as it is free from bilinear
pairing and MTP function.
(3) Formal security: In the literature, most of the 2PAKA
protocols claimed their security informally, which may
not be considered to be fully secured against all attacks.
However, we analyzed our protocol formally based on
the BAN logic model, which assures the security of the
proposed protocol claimed in this paper. It also provides
all other security attributes of an ID-2PAKA protocol
(Blake-Wilson et al., 1997).
1.4. Outline of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
have described some preliminaries, which are used throughout
the paper. Section 3 described the proposed protocol and its
security analysis using the BAN logic model is given in
Section 4. A comparison of our protocol with the related pro-
tocols in terms of security, computation and communication
costs is given in Section 5. Finally, the paper ended with some
remarks in Section 6.2. Preliminaries
In this section, we have discussed the preliminaries of the the-
ory of elliptic curve cryptography, identity-based cryptosystem
and some computational problems.
2.1. Elliptic curve cryptography
Miller et al. (1985) and Koblitz (1987) first proposed the
elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and it is believed that the
computation of ECC-based discrete logarithm problem using
any polynomial-time bounded algorithm is computationally
infeasable. In addition, a 160 bit size ECC-based key offers
the same level of security as that obtained using a 1024 bit
RSA-based key. Further, the elementary operations like point
multiplication, addition etc. in the elliptic curve group are
much faster than the modular exponentiation executed in the
multiplicative group. Therefore, the ECC-based protocols are
efficient in terms of (1) security, (2) computation, (3) storage
and (4) communication bandwidth.
Let Epða; bÞ be a set of elliptic curve points over the prime
field Fp, defined by the following non-singular elliptic curve
equation:
y2modp ¼ ðx3 þ axþ bÞmodp with x; y; a; b
2 Fp and ð4a3 þ 27b2Þmod p–0 ð1Þ
The additive cyclic elliptic curve group defined as
Gp ¼ fðx; yÞ : x; y 2 Fp and ðx; yÞ 2 Epða; bÞg [ fOg, where the
point O is known as ‘‘point at infinity” or ‘‘zero point”. A brief
discussion about the elliptic curve group properties is given
below:
 Point addition. LetP ;Q be two points on the curve (1), then
P þ Q ¼ R, where the line joining P and Q intersects the
curve (1) at R, and the reflection of it with respect to the
x-axis is the point R.
 Point subtraction. If Q ¼ P , then P þ Q ¼ P  P ¼ O i.e.,
the line joining P and P intersects the curve (1) at the
point O.
 Point doubling. Point doubling is the addition of a point P
on the curve (1) to itself to obtain another point Q on the
same curve. Let 2P ¼ Q, the tangent line at P intersects
the curve (1) at Q; reflection of it with respect to the x-
axis is the point Q. The scalar point multiplication on the
cyclic group Gp is defined as kP ¼ P þ P þ    þ P ðk timesÞ.
 Order of a point. A point P has order n if nP ¼ O for small-
est integer n > 0. More about the elliptic curve and its
group properties can be found in Hankerson et al. (2004).
2.2. Identity-based cryptosystem
The traditional PKI-based cryptosystem needs a certificate to
authenticate user’s public key. However, the PKI-based system
suffers from the problem of management of public keys and
certificates for a large organization. These difficulties can be
defeated by means of identity-based cryptography (IBC) pro-
posed by Shamir et al. (1981). In IBC, a publicly known string
such as email address, physical IP address, etc. is used as a
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ator (PKG) creates user’s private key by binding his/her mas-
ter private key and the identity of the user. The user’s private
key, which is given by PKG to the corresponding user through
a secure channel, is only known to the corresponding user and
PKG. The main advantages of using IBC includes: (1) elimina-
tion of public key certificates, (2) public keys need not to be
exchanged prior to the communication, (3) public keys can
be revoked easily by binding an expiry date to the public
key, etc. Compared with PKI-based cryptosystems, IBC pro-
vides more lightweight, flexible usage and easy management
of public keys and thus, it is efficiently applicable to real envi-
ronments. Note that, (Shamir et al., 1981) does not proposed a
true identity-based encryption/decryption scheme, however,
(Boneh and Franklin, 2001) first proposed a practical
identity-based encryption scheme using bilinear pairing over
the elliptic curve group.
2.3. Computational problem
Definition 1. Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem
(ECDLP): Given two random elements P;Q 2 Gp, for any
polynomial time algorithm it is computationally hard to find
the integer a2RZp such that Q ¼ aP.
Definition 2. Computational Diffie–Hellman problem (CDHP):
Given a random instance ðP; aP; bPÞ 2 Gp for any a; b2RZp,
computation of abP is infeasible by any polynomial time
algorithm.3. The proposed pairing-free ID-2PAKA protocol
This section proposed a pairing-free ID-2PAKA protocol,
which eliminates the security flaws of protocols available in
the literature without increasing the communication rounds.
The list of notations used in the proposed protocol is explained
in the Table 1. The proposed protocol consists of three entities,
namely a trusted private key generator (PKG) and two users A
and B, who act as the initiator and responder, respectively. TheTable 1 List of notations and their meanings used in the proposed
Notation Description
PKG Private Key Generat
IDi Identity of the user i
p A large prime numb
Ep(a, b) A set of elliptic curv
P Base point of the ell
Hi() One-way and secure
dA Private key of A, wh
PA Public key of A, whe
dB Private key of B, wh
PB Public key of B, whe
a Random number cho
b Random number cho
SA Signature of (TA, RA
SB Signature of (TB, RB
SK Session key, where S
KA ¼ ðaþ dAÞ2TB ¼protocol comprises three algorithms like Setup, Extract and
Key agreement, each of which is described below:
3.1. Setup phase
This algorithm takes a security parameter k 2 Zþ as input, and
returns system’s parameter and a master key. Given k, PKG
does the following:
(a) Chooses a k-bit prime p and determines the tuple
fF p;E=F p;Gp; Pg, where the point P is the generator of
Gp.
(b) Chooses the master key x2RZp and computes the system
public key Ppub ¼ xP .
(c) Chooses three one-way and secure hash functions
H 0 : f0; 1g  Gp!Zp, H 1 : G3p!Zp and H 2 : f0; 1g
f0; 1g  G6p!f0; 1gk .
(d) PublishesX ¼ fF p;E=F p;Gp; p; P ; Ppub;H 0;H 1;H 2g as the
system’s parameter and keeps the master key x secret.
3.2. Extract phase
This algorithm takes PKG’s master private key, identity of a
user, and the system’s parameter as input, and then returns
the identity-based long-term private key of a user as explained
below. For a user A with identifier IDA, the PKG executes the
following:
(a) Chooses rA2RZp, computes RA ¼ rAP and hA ¼ H 0
ðIDA;RAÞ.
(b) Computes dA ¼ ðrA þ hAxÞmod p.
PKG sends ðdA;RAÞ via a secure and confidential channel to
the user A. The corresponding public key of A is computed
as PA ¼ RA þ H 0ðIDA;RAÞPpub and the private/public key pair
ðdA; PAÞ can be verified by checking whether the equation
PA ¼ RA þ H 0ðIDA;RAÞPpub ¼ dAP holds. Sincepairing-free ID-2PAKA protocol.
or
, i e {A, B}.
er
e points over the prime field Fp
iptic curve group of order n
hash function, i= 0, 1, 2
ere dA = (rA + hAx) mod p, rA e Zp
*, RA= rAP, hA= H0(IDA, RA)
re PA = RA + hAPpub = dAP
ere dB = (rB + hBx) mod p, rB e Zp
*, RB = rBP, hB =H0(IDB, RB)
re PB = RB + hBPpub = dBP
sen by the user A, where TA = (a + dA)
2P
sen by the user B, where TB = (b + dB)
2P
) computed by A as SA ¼ ðaþ dAÞ2ðdA þH1ðTA;RAÞÞ1
) computed by B as SB ¼ ðbþ dBÞ2ðdB þH1ðTB;RBÞÞ1
K ¼ H2ðIDA; IDB;TA;TB;KAÞ ¼ H2ðIDA; IDB;TA;TB;KBÞ and
ðaþ dAÞ2ðbþ dBÞ2P ¼ ðbþ dBÞ2TA ¼ KB
Figure 1 Key agreement phase of the proposed protocol.
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¼ rAPþH0ðIDA;RAÞxP
¼ ðrA þH0ðIDA;RAÞxÞP
¼ ðrA þ hAxÞP
¼ dAP3.3. Key agreement phase
Step 1. The user A selects a2RZp and performs the following:
(1) Compute T A ¼ ðaþ dAÞ2P and SA ¼ ðaþ dAÞ2ðdA þ H 1
ðT A;RAÞÞ1:
(2) SendðIDA; T A;RA; SAÞ through an open channel to B.
Step 2. On receiving the message ðIDA; T A;RA; SAÞ, B chooses
b2RZp and does the following:
(1) Computes T B ¼ ðbþ dBÞ2P and SB ¼ ðbþ dBÞ2ðdB þ H 1
ðT B;RBÞÞ1.
(2) Sends ðIDB; T B;RB; SBÞ over an open channel to A.
Step 3. Now, A and B execute the following operations:
(1) A computes PB ¼ RB þ H 0ðIDB;RBÞPpub and checks
whether SBðPB þ H 1ðT B;RBÞP Þ ¼ T B holds. If it holds,
A computes KA ¼ ðaþ dAÞ2T B and the session key as
SK ¼ H 2ðIDA; IDB; T A; T B;KAÞ.
(2) Similarly, B computes PA ¼ RA þ H 0ðIDA;RAÞPpub and
verifies the equation SAðPA þ H 1ðT A;RAÞP Þ ¼ T A. If it
holds, B computes KB ¼ ðbþ dBÞ2T A and the session
key as SK ¼ H 2ðIDA; IDB; T A; T B;KBÞ.
 Correctness of the protocol: A and B compute the partial ses-
sion key as KA ¼ ðaþ dAÞ2T B ¼ ðaþ dAÞ2ðbþ dBÞ2P ¼
ðbþ dBÞ2T A ¼ KB and thus, A and B successfully estab-
lished a common and secure session key SK between them.
The key agreement phase of the proposed protocol is given
in Fig. 1.4. Formal analysis of the proposed protocol using BAN logic
model
In 1990, Burrows et al. (1990) proposed the BAN logic model,
which defines some simple, but sound and powerful tools
based on which the cryptographic protocols can be analyzed
more rigorously than any informal method. In this section,
we analyzed and justified the correctness of our protocol using
the BAN logic model. We first described the BAN logic model
and then the security analysis of the proposed protocol using
BAN logic is shown below.
4.1. Definition of BAN logic model
This section described the basic syntax, semantics and infer-
ence rules used in BAN logic model (Burrows et al., 1990;
Yang and Li, 2006). In this model, P and Q denote the princi-
pals, where PP and PQ denote the public keys, and dP, dQ
denote the corresponding secret keys.
4.1.1. Basic notations and descriptions
We briefly described some basic notations and semantics of the
BAN logic model as follows.
(N1) P j  X : P believes X, which means that P believes if X is
true.
(N2) P / X : P sees X. That is, someone sends a message con-
taining X to P and P reads and repeats X.
(N3) P j‘X : P once said X. That is, at some time P sent a
message including X, which is not known whether the
message was sent long ago or during the current run
of the protocol, but it is known that P believes X then.
(N4) P jj‘X : P has recently said X. This means that P uttered
X in the current run of the protocol.
(N5) P j ) X : P controls X. That is, P has an authorization
over the statement X and should be trusted on it.
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sent in a message at any time before the current run of
the protocol.
(N7) !PP P : It means that PP is the public key of P and the
corresponding secret key dP will never be discovered
by others except P or an entity trusted by him.
(N8) fXgK :This represents the formula X is encrypted under
the key K.
(N9) P$K Q : P and Q may use the symmetric key K for
secure communication and it will never be discovered
by others except P or Q, or an entity trusted by either
of them.
(N10) PQ : It means if P is true then Q is also true.
4.1.2. Inference rules
In the following, we described a set of inference rules of BAN
logic model defined in Burrows et al. (1990), Yang and Li
(2006).
(P1) Message-meaning rule: This rule is related with the inter-
pretation of messages and helps to explain the origin of
the messages. If P believes PQ be the Q’s public key and
receives a message fXgdQ encrypted under Q’s private
key dQ; then P may conclude that Q once said the mes-
sage X, i.e.,
P j  !PQ Q; P / fXgdQ
P j  Qj‘X .
(P2) Nonce verification rule: If P believes that X is fresh and
that Q has said X during the current state of the proto-
col, then P believes that Q believes X, that is,
P j  #ðX Þ; P j  Qj‘X
P j  Qj  X .
(P3) Jurisdiction rule: If P believes that Q has jurisdiction
over the statement X and P believes that Q believes X,
then P believes X, i.e.,
P j  Qj ) X ; P j  Qj  X
P j  X .
(P4) Seeing rule: If P sees a message (X, Y), then it also sees
part of the message (i.e., X and Y), provided that the key
is known to him, i.e.,
P / X ; P / Y
P / ðX ; Y Þ .
(P5) Belief rule: The principal P can believe a collection of
statements if and only if P believes each of the state-
ments individually, i.e.,
P j  X ; P j  Y
P j  ðX ; Y Þ and
P j  ðX ; Y Þ
P j  X .
(P6) Freshness rule: If P believes that one part X of a formula
is fresh, then it believes that the entire formula (X, Y)
must also be fresh, that is,
P j  #ðX Þ
P j  #ðX ; Y Þ. But (X, Y)
being fresh tell us nothing about the freshness of either
X or Y.
(P7) Session key rule: If P believes the session key SK is fresh
and P believes Q believes X, then P believes P$SK Q, that
is,
P j  #ðSKÞ; P j  Qj  X
P j  P$SK Q
, where X is the main part
from which SK is derived.4.1.3. Synthetic rules
In the BAN logic model, the inference rules and basic postu-
lates help to meet the desired goals of the cryptographic proto-
cols. Buttyan et al. (1998) also derives a set of synthetic rules
that can be used to build a cryptographic protocol in a system-
atic way and to prove the soundness of the protocol. We have
listed some of such synthetic rules as given below. The nota-
tion R#S means, the formula S is deduced from the formula
R.
ðS1ÞP/X#P/ ðX;YÞ ðS3ÞPj Qj‘X#Q/X
ðS2ÞPj Qj‘X#Pj Qj‘ðX;YÞ ðS4ÞPj Qjj‘X#Pj #ðXÞ4.2. Analysis of the proposed protocol
In this section, we formally proved the correctness and sound-
ness of the proposed protocol based on BAN logic model, i.e.,
at the end of a session both the users ensure that they establish
a fresh session key among them.
4.2.1. Initial assumptions
To analyze the proposed protocol, we first list the following
assumptions about the initial state of the protocol:
ðA1ÞAj  !PB B ðA4ÞBj  !PB B
ðA2ÞBj  !PA A ðA5ÞAj  #ðTAÞ
ðA3ÞAj  !PA A ðA6ÞBj  #ðTBÞ
ðA7ÞAj  #ðRAÞ ðA11ÞAj  Bj ) ðTBÞ
ðA8ÞBj  #ðRBÞ ðA12ÞBj  Aj ) ðTAÞ
ðA9ÞAj  Bj ) PB ðA13ÞAj  Bj ) RB
ðA10ÞBj  Aj ) PA ðA14ÞBj  Aj ) RA4.2.2. Idealized form
Now we transformed the proposed protocol to an idealized
form according to the BAN logic model as given below:
ðI1ÞA!B : TA;RA; fTA;RAgdAðI2ÞB!A : TB;RB; fTB;RBgdB4.2.3. Goals to be achieved
The main concern of our protocol is to build the trust between
the users A and B such that they can share a common and fresh
secret key in each session. Therefore, we have to reach the fol-
lowing goals in order to validate the security claim of the pro-
posed protocol:
ðG1ÞAj  A$SK A ðG3ÞAj  Bj  A$SK B
ðG2ÞBj  A$SK A ðG4ÞBj  Aj  A$SK B4.2.4. Verification of the protocol
In this section, we analyzed the ideal form of the protocol
using the BAN logic model. The detailed steps are given as
follows:
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(V1) Aj  ðT A;RAÞ
(V2) B / ðT A;RAÞ
(V3) B / fT A;RAgdA
From (I2) we obtain the following:
(V4) Bj  ðT B;RBÞ
(V5) A / ðT B;RBÞ
(V6) A / fT B;RBgdB
From (V3) and (A2), on applying message-meaning rule
(P1), we get
(V7) Bj  Aj‘ ðT A;RAÞ
From the initial assumptions (A5), (A7) and through fresh-
ness rule (P6), we obtain
(V8) Aj  #ðT A;RAÞ
From (V7) and (V8), we can say,
(V9) Bj  Ajj‘ ðT A;RAÞ
From (V9) and using the synthetic rule (S4) we get
(V10) Bj  #ðT A;RAÞ
From (V7), (V10) and through the nonce verification rule
(P2), we get
(V11) Bj  Aj  ðT A;RAÞ
On applying the belief rule (P5), we get from (V11)
(V12) Bj  Aj  ðT AÞ
(V13) Bj  Aj  RA
On applying the jurisdiction rule (P3), from (V12) and the
initial assumption (A12), we get
(V14) Bj  ðT AÞ
On applying jurisdiction rule (P3), from (A14) and (V13),
we get
(V15) Bj  RA
Now, B computes PAand KB, and finally the session key
SK. From KBand (V10), on applying the freshness rule (P6),
we get
(V16) Bj  # ðKBÞAlso from (V16), we get
(V17) Bj  # ðSKÞ
From (V11) and (V17), on applying the session key rule
(P7), we obtain
(V18) Bj  A$SK B
Due to the symmetry of the protocol, A believes that B is
bound to derive the same belief as
(V19) Bj  Aj  A$SK B
From (V6) and the initial assumption (A1), on applying the
message-meaning rule (P1), we get
(V20) Aj  Bj‘ ðT B;RBÞ
From the initial assumptions (A4), (A8) and through fresh-
ness rule (P6), we obtain
(V21) Bj  #ðT B;RBÞ
From (V20) and (V21), we have,
(V22) Aj  Bjj‘ ðT B;RBÞ
From (V22) and the synthetic rule (S4), we get
(V23) Aj  #ðT B;RBÞ
From (V20), (V23) and through the nonce verification rule
(P2), we get
(V24) Aj  Bj  ðT B;RBÞ
From (V24), on applying the belief rule (P5), we get
(V25) Aj  Bj  ðT BÞ
(V26) Aj  Bj  RB
From (A11), (V25) and through the jurisdiction rule (P3),
we get
(V27) Aj  ðT BÞ
From (A13), (V26) and through the jurisdiction rule (P3),
we get
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The user A computes PB and KA; and the final session key
SK: From KA and (V23) and using the freshness rule (P6), we
get
(V29) Aj  # ðKAÞ
From (V29), we get
(V30) Aj  # ðSKÞ
From (V24), (V30) and using the session key rule (P7), we
obtain
(V31) Aj  A$SK B
Due to the symmetry of the protocol, A believes that B is
bound to derive the same belief as
(V32) Aj  Bj  A$SK B
Thus, we have reached the desired goals (G1), (G2), (G3)
and (G4) of the proposed protocol corresponding to the equa-
tions (V17), (V18), (V31) and (V32) as shown above, and it can
be concluded that A and B successfully generate a fresh, com-
mon and secure session key between them using the protocol
presented in this paper.
4.3. Security analysis of the proposed protocol against different
attacks
In addition to the formal security analysis through BAN logic
model, the proposed protocol also provides other security
attributes and resilience against all possible attacks such as
known session-specific temporary information attack, key
replicating/key off-set attack, known-key attack, key-
compromise impersonation attack, perfect forward security,
PKG forward security, etc. as discussed in Boyd and Choo
(2005), Blake-Wilson et al. (1997), Menezes et al. (1997). Note
that the security of the proposed protocol against these attacks
depends on the infeasibility of solving the ECDLP and CDHP
in the elliptic curve group.
4.3.1. Known session-specific temporary information attack
(KSTIA)
The known session-specific temporary information attack
states that the secrecy of the generated session key should
not be exposed to an outsider even if the ephemeral secrets
of a session are known to him/her. As stated, A and B compute
the session key SK, whose security entirely depends on the par-
tial session key KAð¼ KBÞ. Now even if the ephemeral session
secrets ða; bÞ are exposed, then an outsider only can generate
the session key SK if dA and dB are known to him/her.
However, the computation of dA and dB are not possible from
the public keys ðPA;PBÞ due to the difficulties of ECDLP.Therefore, the known-session specific temporary information
attack is infeasible in our protocol.
4.3.2. Key off-set attack (KOA)/Key replicating attack (KRA)
The proposed protocol can withstand the key off-set attack. In
our protocol, the user A initiates the session key agreement
phase by sending a message ðIDA;TA;RA;SAÞ to the user B.
Suppose that an adversary E captures the message
ðIDA;TA;RA;SAÞ and modifies it to ðIDA;TA;RA;SAÞ, and
then forwards the same to B. Let us consider TA ¼ rTA for
an arbitrary constant r. Note that E can never forge the signa-
ture SA without knowing the private key dA of A to compen-
sate the change and forge the message. On the other hand,
user B, on receiving ðIDA;TA;RA;SAÞ, checks the validity of
the message with the equation SAðPA þH1ðTA;RAÞPÞ ¼ TA as
SAðPA þH1ðTA;RAÞPÞ ¼ ðaþ dAÞ2ðdA þH1ðTA;RAÞÞ1
ðPA þH1ðTA;RAÞPÞ
¼ ðaþ dAÞ2ðdA þH1ðTA;RAÞÞ1
ðdA þH1ðTA;RAÞÞP
½)H1ðTA;RAÞ–H1ðTA;RAÞ
Since the verification fails, thus the key agreement session is
terminated by B. Therefore, the key off-set attack/key replicat-
ing attack is not possible in our proposed protocol.4.3.3. Key freshness/No key control (NKC)
The property of session key freshness is defined in Menezes
et al. (1997), which states that neither communicating entity
can predetermine the session key being established subse-
quently. In 2005, (Phan, 2005) analyzed that Harn et al.’s
Diffie-Hellman-DSA key exchange protocol (Harn et al.,
2004) does not provide session key freshness. In order to
achieve this property, Phan suggested that the generated par-
tial session key KA should be computed from the ephemeral
secrets ða; bÞ chosen independently by both participants A
and B. In our protocol, A and B contributed to generate the
session key in the same manner as suggested by Phan (2005)
and neither participant can force the other for the session
key to be a preselected value or the session key lies within a
set containing a small number of elements. Since the session
key SK depends on ðTA;TBÞ, the contributions of A and B,
respectively, the partial session key KA can only be computed
by the participants cooperatively and any single entity cannot
control the outcome of the session keys or enforce the other.
Thus, the property of the session key freshness/no key control
is preserved in our protocol.
4.3.4. Known-key attack (K-KA)
Assume that the session key SK of any previous session is com-
promised to an adversary E, however, in the proposed proto-
col, any future session key cannot be obtained from an
exposed session key. In our proposed protocol, a unique and
fresh session key is computed in each session using the private
keys dA and dB, and the ephemeral secrets ða; bÞ, which differ in
every session. Since E, due to the difficulties of ECDLP, can-
not derive the ephemeral secrets ða; bÞ from ðTA;TBÞ (also
the private keys dA and dB from PA and PB), and thus, the dis-
closure of one session key does not allow E to gain any secret
knowledge from which any other future session keys can be
Table 2 Security comparison of the proposed protocol with
others.
Protocol Weaknesses against attack(s)
Smart (2002) PFS
Shim (2003) MIMA
Ryu et al. (2004) K-CI, RA
Wang et al. (2009) KOA,K-CI,
McCullagh and Barreto (2005) KOA, KSTIA,K-CI
Xie (2004) K-CI
Zhu et al. (2007) KSTIA
Cao et al. (2008) KOA, KSTIA
Cao et al. (2010) KOA, KSTIA
Sui et al. (2005) OPGA
Lu et al. (2007) PGA, OPGA
Chang and Chang (2008) MA
Proposed Not found
OPGA: off-line password guessing attack; PGA: Parallel guessing
attack; MA: Mutual authentication.
Table 3 Running time (ms) of different operations.
Notation Descriptions and running time
TBP Time to execute bilinear pairing, TBP 	 20.01 ms
TPX Time to execute pairing-based exponentiation,
TPX 	 6.38 ms
TEM Time to execute elliptic curve scalar point
multiplication, TEM 	 0.83 ms
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attack protected.
4.3.5. Perfect forward security (PFS) and PKG forward
security (PKG-FS)
The protection of this attack means that the disclosure of
users’ private keys must not allow the compromise of any past
session keys i.e., if the private keys of A and B are compro-
mised, the adversary E cannot recover any past session keys.
It is known that E can compute the session key SK if and only
if KAð¼ KBÞ is known. Now if the private keys dA and dB of A
and B are disclosed, however, E cannot obtain KA because
ða; bÞ are unknown to him/her. The partial session key KA can-
not be calculated by E since ða; bÞ are unknown due to the
infeasibility of deriving them from ðTA;TBÞ by solving
ECDLP. Also from this discussion, any one can see if the
secret key of PKG is disclosed so the secret keys of all partic-
ipants are compromised, however, the current or past session
keys are still secured and valid. Thus, the perfect forward secu-
rity and PKG forward security are preserved in our protocol.
4.3.6. Key-compromise impersonation attack (K-CI)
Suppose A’s secret key dA is exposed to an adversary E, who
then tries to impersonate B to A in order to obtain the current
session key. However, E cannot impersonate B, since the sig-
nature SB without B’s private key cannot be generated. There-
fore, the K-CI attack is protected in the proposed protocol.
4.3.7. Reflection attack (RA) and Unknown key-share attack
(UKA)
In the proposed protocol, note that the session key SK is gen-
erated not only using KAð¼ KBÞ, but also using the identities of
the participants and the messages ðTA;TBÞ exchanged in a ses-
sion. Thus, according to Wang et al. (2009), our protocol pro-
vides the resilience against the unknown key-share attack and
reflection attack.
5. Comparison of the proposed protocol with contemporary
protocols
In this section, we compared the proposed protocol with other
existing protocols (Smart, 2002; Shim, 2003; Ryu et al., 2004;
Wang et al., 2009; McCullagh and Barreto, 2005; Xie, 2004;
Zhu et al., 2007; Cao et al., 2008, 2010; Sui et al., 2005; Lu
et al., 2007; Chang and Chang, 2008) in terms of security, com-
putation and communication efficiency.
5.1. Security comparison
In Section 1.1, we provided a literature survey, which shows
that out of the most recently published protocols, two of them
(Cao et al., 2008, 2010) are the most efficient both in commu-
nication and computation costs. However, the paper (Islam
and Biswas, 2012) shows that these two protocols are vulnera-
ble to KSTIA and KOA attacks. The KSTIA as described in
Blake-Wilson et al. (1997), Zhao and Gu (2012) states that
the session key should not be compromised even if the session’s
ephemeral secrets are exposed (loss of secret information/leak-
age of ephemeral keys). Blake-Wilson et al. (1997) investigated
the KOA attack and pointed out that any authenticated keyagreement protocol, which does not contain asymmetry in
the session key formation, is vulnerable to this attack. In such
an attack, an active adversary can intercept, modify and delete
the messages exchanged between the entities (users), and can
force them to accept the same session key, which is not actually
the one the entities want to agree on. According to the above
discussion, it is supposed that protocols in Smart (2002), Chen
and Kudla (2002), Ryu et al. (2004), Wang et al. (2009),
McCullagh and Barreto (2005), Xie (2004), Cao et al. (2008,
2010) and McCullagh and Barreto, 2005; Zhu et al., 2007;
Cao et al., 2008, 2010 are not secure against KOA and KSTIA
attacks. A summarization of the security analysis of the differ-
ent key agreement protocols including ours is given in Table 2,
which shows that the proposed protocol is more efficient than
others.
5.2. Efficiency comparison
In this section, we provide a comparison between our and
other existing protocols in terms of communication round,
bandwidth requirement and computation cost. According to
the experimental results of Cao et al. (2010), the running times
(miliseconds) are given in Table 3, where the hardware plat-
form is a PIV 3 GHZ processor with 512 M bytes memory
and the Windows XP operating system. To evaluate the effi-
ciency of our protocol with others against the communication
cost, we have followed the concept as discussed in Cao et al.
(2010), which states that for achieving the comparable security
Table 4 Comparison of computation and communication efficiency.
Protocol Communication Cost Computation cost
Communication round Bandwidth required (bits)
Wang et al. (2009) 2 512  1 = 512 2TBP + 4TEM 	 43.34 ms
McCullagh and Barreto (2005) 2 512  1 = 512 2TBP + 2TEM + 2TPX 	 54.44 ms
Wang et al. (2008) 2 512  2 = 1024 2TBP + 6TEM 	 45.00 ms
Choie et al. (2005) 2 512  2 = 1024 4TBP + 6TEM 	 85.02 ms
Choie et al. (2005) 2 512  1 = 512 4TBP + 8TEM 	 86.68 ms
Zhu et al. (2007) 3 160  4 = 640 12TEM 	 10.06 ms
Cao et al. (2008) 3 160  2 = 320 12TEM 	 9.96 ms
Cao et al. (2010) 2 160  2 = 320 10TEM 	 8.30 ms
Ho¨lbl et al. (2012) 2 512  3 + 160 = 1696 6TBP + 10TEM + 2TPX 	 141.12 ms
Proposed 2 160  3 = 480 8TEM 	 6.64 ms
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cols execute the Tate pairing operation on a super singular
elliptic curve E(Fp): y
2 = x3 + x (Miller et al., 1985; Koblitz,
1987) with embedding degree 2 and the large prime order p,
which is a 160-bit Solinas prime of the form
p = 2159 + 217 + 1 and q is at least 512-bit prime number that
satisfies the condition q + 1= 12pr (Solinas et al., 2011). In
order to meet the same level of security, pairing-free elliptic
curve-based protocols execute different operations on the
Koblitz curve defined as y2 = x3 + ax2 + b on Fl, l = 2
163
with a = 1 and b is a 163-bit random prime number
(Koblitz, 1987). Thus, the security provided by a 512-bit ran-
dom number in a pairing-based protocol is equivalent to a
160-bit random number in a pairing-free protocol. Here, we
assume that the output of the hash function H() is 160 bits.
In Table 4, we given the comparative results of our protocol
and other existing protocols in terms of communication round,
bandwidth requirement and computation cost.
It is found that although the proposed protocol and Cao
et al.’s protocol (Cao et al., 2010) have the same communica-
tion round (minimum number of rounds), however, our proto-
col requires slightly more communication bandwidth. Note
that the proposed protocol requires lesser computation costs
than others, and the protection of all kinds of attacks is possi-
ble in our protocol with the sacrifice of slightly increased band-
width requirement. Therefore, it can be claimed that our
protocol is more secure than others and thus, suitable for dif-
ferent real life applications including wireless communications.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an improved pairing-free
ID-2PAKA protocol using elliptic curve cryptography and
identity-based cryptosystem. The proposed protocol is secure
than the protocols proposed earlier. The formal analysis for
the validity of the proposed protocol based on the BAN logic
model is given. The security of the proposed protocol is based
on the difficulties of solving the ECDLP and the CDHP, and
thus, the resilience against all possible attacks and their
detailed analysis is given. The efficiency analysis in terms of
computation cost and communication cost is done, which
shows that our protocol increases the computation and com-
munication costs with respect to others.Acknowledgments
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